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OPEN LETTER TO ALL STUDENTS
"How doth the little crocodile
Improve his shining tail,
And pour the waters of the Nile
On every golden scale!
How cheerfully he seems to grin,
How neatly spreads his claws,
And welcomes little fishes in,
With gently smiling jaws!"[l]
On behalf of the Faculty and the Admin-
istration, I welcome the largest group of stu-
dents in Loyola's 45 year history.
I wish to point out to the new students in
particular that whether the next several years
involve more "grin" than "claws," or vice
versa, depends largely upon you. Your pro-
fessors begin with the assumption that each
student is intelligent, diligent, cooperative and
has a sense of humor. Only you can prove
they are wrong with respect to each or all
of such adjectives. Make an effort to know
your teachers in and out of class.
There is no "suggestion box" or "problem
box" outside the Dean's office, and we have
no couches. But all students, new and old, will
do well to remember that discussion of a
problem with professors or deans cannot hurt,
and may help you.
1. Lewis Carroll-Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
(1865)
J. REX DIBBLE
Dean
You have available an excellent library, in-
terested and competent library personnel, good
facilities for study and research, a new and
comfortable building. You have decided to
invest three or four years time and a sub-
stantial amount of money in the study of the
law. Don't short-change yourself.
Good luck.
J. Rex Dibble
Dean
FACULTY HONOR AWARD PRESENTED
this year the annual Faculty Honor Award
was presented to Patrick Lynch of the Third
Year Class Day Division. This award is pre-
sented by members of the faculty to the out-
standing third year student who they feel is
deserving of particular recognition.
This award is unique in that the contribu-
tions come entirely from the faculty mem-
bers, both full-time and part-time. In deter-
2
mining who the recipient shall be, the faculty
consider the student's overall scholastic record
together with his work in Legal Writing II. This
year the presentation amounted to $565.00
and was given at the monthly faculty meeting.
The Digest wishes to express its warmest
congratulations to Patrick Lynch for his
supenor scholastic achievements here at
Loyola.
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INHERITANCE
AND GIFT TAX
LEGISLATION-1965
By Alan Cranston
STATE CONTROLLER
INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAX
DIVISION LEGISLATION-1965
1965 legislation which becomes effective on
September 17, 1965, makes the following
changes affecting administration of the in-
heritance and gift tax laws.
DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY FOR
INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAX PURPOSES
In applying the inheritance and gift tax
laws, community property resulting from con-
versions of separate property by gift or agree-
ment of the spouses has been treated in the
same manner as ordinary community property
acquired as such during marriage' from earn-
ings, etc. The 1965 legislation provides for
different treatment of community property
resulting from a conversion of one of the
spouse's separate property. Where such a con-
version has been effected, each sponse's in-
terest shall, for inheritance and gift tax pur-
poses, be treated as separate arid not as com-
munity property. This change was affected
by adding new Sections 13560 (inheritance
tax) and 15310 (gift tax) to the Revenue
and Taxation Code.
Text of the new sections:
13560. If one spouse makes a gift of an
interest in separate property to the other
and the interest so given, together with an
equal interest retained by the donor, becomes
their community property, such equal inter-
ests shall be treated as held by them as their
separate property, and not as community
property, for purposes of this part.
15310. Reads the same as Section 13560.
NOTE: The Department will take the posi-
tion that these provisions apply not only to
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State Controller
the identical property converted but to the
rents, issues and profits thereof as well.
The new sections do not, of course, alter the
character of the property for purposes of
distribution. The converted property will
maintain its community character in apply-
ing provisions of a will or the laws of sue-
< cession to determine amounts distributable
to heirs and legatees. It is treated as sep-
arate property only in applying the tax pro-
visions to the amounts so distributed.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-
INHERIT ANCE TAX
(I) COMMUNITY PROPERTY PASSING TO A
SPOUSE
Under pre-1965 law, as amended in 1961,
all community property passing to a sopuse
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was excluded from inheritance tax with the
exception that a decedent husband's half of
the community property was subject to tax
in the event he gave his wife a life estate or
power of appointment therein.
The 1965 amendments now increase the ex-
cluded portion by further narrowing the ex-
ception. Under the new law a life estate given
the wife in the husband's half of the property
will also be excluded. The decedent husband's
transfer of a power of appointment in his half
of the community property to his wife re-
mains taxable under the 1965 amendments
as it was under prior law with, however, an
exception in cases where she is given an in-
terest in the property in addition to the power
itself. Under the new law, where the wife is
given an interest in the property in addi-
tion to the power, that portion of the prop-
erty subject to the power is excluded which
is equal to the value of the additional in-
terest given the wife or to the value of a life
estate in the property for the life of the wife,
whichever is less. The typical case to which
this provision will be applicable is one where
the decendent husband gives his wife a life
estate in his half of the community property
with a power of appointment over the entire
half. In such instances the life estate will be
excluded and the value of the remainder will
be taxed to the wife as donee of the power.
These changes were effected by amending
Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 13551
(a), 13554 and 13692 ,renumbered 13'694)
and repealing Section 13552.
('2) COMMUNITY PROPERTY PASSING TO
OTHERS
Prior to the 1965 amendments, Revenue
and Taxation Code Section 13551 (b) pro-
vided, "All of the community property passing
to anyone other than the surviving sponse is
subject to this part." From the inception of our
inheritance tax, this provision and its counter-
parts in prior inheritance tax laws have been
interpreted by the Department and by tax-
payers at large to mean what it says, i.e., that
community property passing to others is tax-
able whether it is the decendent's interest, the
4
SUrVIVIngspouse's interest or both. Section
13551 (b) as so interpreted has been
amended both by "judicial legislation" re-
sulting from the recent decision in Estate of
Carson, 234 A.C.A. 594, and by the 1965
amendments. Estate 0/ Carson held that Sec-
tion 1'3551 (b) applied only to the decedent's
half of the community property and the wife's
portion passing to third persons (for example,
by virtue of her election to take under a hus-
band's will so disposing of her interest) could
not be taxed under Section 13551 (b) as the
husband's transfer. The 1965 legislation ac-
complished the same result by amending
Section 13551.
Text of the amended section:
13551. Upon the death of a spouse:
-* * -*
(b) All of the decedent's half interest in
the community property passing to anyone
other than the surviving spouse is subject to
this part.
NOTE: Although the amendment is applic-
able only to decedents dying subsequent to
its effective date, S:eptember 17, 1965, the
law change, by virtue of the Carson decision,
is effective as to all cases in which the tax
has not been fixed.
This change in the treatment of com-
munity property passing to others will have
a gift tax effect. Where, in election cases,
benertctartes other than the wife receive all
or a portion of her share of the 'community
property which is no longer subject to in-
heritance tax as the ctecedent husband's
transfer, such property will be subject to
gift tax as a transfer from the wife.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-GIFT TAX
(l) DONOR'S GIFT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
TO SPOUSE
Prior to the 1965 amendments, a donor's
transfer of his interest in community property
to his spouse was subject to gift tax in the
same manner as any other gift. The new law,
by amending Revenue and Taxation Code Sec-
tion 15301 and adding Section 15301.5, now
exempts transfers of community property to
a spouse.
Text or the amended and new section:
15301. In the case of a transfer to. either
spouse by the other of community property,
none of the property transferred is subject
to this part.
15301.5 In the case or a transfer to either
spouse by the other of quasi-community
property, one-half of the property trans-
ferred is subject to this part.
NOTE: Under prior law both community
property and quasi-community were covered
in a single section, i.e., 15301.
(2) CONVERSION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY TO
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The 1965 amendments repeal Revenue and
Taxation Code Section 15303. The pupose of
Section 15303 was to recapture as gift tax
the inheritance tax lost by application of the
community property exclusion to community
property which had been converted from the
separate property of the decedent prior to
death. In such cases, Section 15303, in addi-
tion to levying a gift tax upon one-half the
property at the time of conversion, also levied
a gift tax upon the other half at the date of
decedent's death as though the 'decedent's half
of the community resulting from the conver-
sion were transferred at death by gift instead
of inheritance.
Pursuant to repeal of Section 15303 we
shall no longer assess gift tax upon the half
of the community property passing at death.
We shall continue, however, to assess the
tax upon one-half the property at the date of
conversion, since this transfer remains subject
to tax pursuant to general provisions of the
law.
_pointment because of the problem. of deter-
mining the identity of the ultimate benefic-
iaries against whom the tax should be as-
sessed. Historically, California has solved the
problem in one of two ways-one, by taxing
the gift of the power in the estate of the
donor as though the property passed outright
to the donee of the power and two, by assess-
ing no tax upon the gift of the power but wait-
ing until the donee's death and taxing his
exercise of the power in his estate as though
the ultimate beneficiaries (appointees) re-
ceived the property by inheritance from him.
Over the years California has gone back and
forth from one method to the other. The pres-
sent method, number one, has been in effect
since 1935.
The 1965 amendments repeal and re-enact
Chapter 4, Article 5 (commencing with Sec-
tion 13961) which contains the power of ap-
pointment sections. No change is made in the
present method of taxing the gift of a power
of appointment in the estate of the donor. As
indicated above, it is taxed as a transfer of
the property to the donee of the power. The
amendments retain this tax on the gift of the
power and in addition tax the exercise or non-
exercise of certain general powers of appoint-
ment in the estate of the donee or holder of
the power as though the property subject to his
power passed by taxable transfer from him
to his appointees (in cases where he exercises
the power) or to the persons who take in de-
fault of exercise (in cases where he fails to
exercise the power).
The policy of the new law is to apply the
Under prior law, in order to collect tax tax to those gen~ral powers :v~ich are so b.road
upon the full amount of the death-gift transfer, ' that they vest. VIrtual beneficial ownership of
the $4,000 annual exemption was disallowed the property III the donee of the power. The
with respect thereto by Section 15402. With situation in such cases is little different than
repeal of Section 15303, it was also necessary if the property had passed outright by in-
therefore to eliminate from Section 15402 as heritance first from the donor of the power
surplusage the provision disallowing the an- to the donee and then from him to the ul~i-
nual exemption. mate takers. It should, therefore, be taxed In
both estates.
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT-
INHERITANCE TAX
It has always been difficult to apply an
inheritance-type death tax to powers of ap-
FALL, 1965
Taxation of general powers in the estate
of the donee or holder of the power is affected
by adopting the federal estate tax provisions
pertaining to the subject with certain changes
tax. The provisions are rather complex. We
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to conform them with our inheritance-type
shall, however, have federal estate tax de-
cisions and regulations to guide us in the in-
terpretation problems which will arise,
The new law specifically defines the powers
which are subject to tax in the estate of the
donee of the power and calls these "general"
powers. All other powers are called "limited"
powers. In substance, the general power as
defined is one which is exercisable by the
decedent-donee of the power in favor of him-
self, his estate, his creditors or the creditors
of his estate. The definition is further refined
to cover special situations where the power is
held jointly by more than one person. Pro-
vision is also made for taxation of general
powers which the donee exercises or realeases
prior to death under circumstances which, if
it were a transfer of the property itself, would
be subject to tax as an inter vivos transfer
under other sections of the law (for example,
exercise or release in contemplation of death).
CHARITIES-INHERITANCE TAX
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 1.3842
provides basically that transfers to charitable
institutions or in trust for charitable pur-
poses are exempt from inheritance tax if (1)
the institution or trust is organized solely for
charitable purposes under the laws of this state
or (2) the property is limited for use in this
state. In Estate of Fleming, 31 c 2d 514, the
court held that a transfer to First National
Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego as trustee
for charitable purposes not limited for use
in California was taxable because the bank
was not organized solely for charitable pur-
poses.
CHARITIES-GIFT TAX
The corresponding charitable· exemption
provision (Revenue and Taxation Code Sec-
tion 15442) was amended by the 1965 legis-
lation to conform to the amendment of inheri-
tance tax Section 13842 as above described.
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Text of amended section:
The wording of the amending phrase is
the same as that contained in Section 13842.
NONRESIDENT DECEQENTS'
INTANGIBLES-INHERITANCE TAX
Prior to 1935 certain intangible property
"located" in California or subject to its juris-
diction (for example, stock of California cor-
porations) belonging to a decedent who was
not a resident of California was considered
subject to our inheritance tax. In order to
attain reciprocity with other states who did
not tax California decedents' intangibles "lo-
cated" there, reciprocity provisions similar to
those contained in present Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code Section 13851 were added to the
Inheritance Tax Law in 1927. The Inheritance
Tax Act of 1935 completely rewrote the in-
heritance tax law. The provisions thereof
which imposed the tax became susceptible
to the interpretation that only the intangibles
of deceased nonresidents of the United States
were taxable (unless the reciprocity provisions
were applicable) while the intangibles of de-
cedents who were residents of states of the
United States other than California were
exempt from tax in any event. Since 1935 the
provisions imposing the tax (presently con-
tained in Section 13303) have been so in-
terpreted by the Department. (See Regulation
13303 (c).)
Although such has been the interpretation
since 1935, the reciprocity provisions were
. never amended to conform thereto. As a result
they make unnecessary reference to reci-
procity with other states of the union in the
taxation of nonresident decedents' intangibles.
. This tends to throw doubt upon the interpreta-
tion ui Section 13303 that such intangibles are
basically exempt independently of reciprocity.
To correct this. condition the 1965 legisla-
tion amends Section 13851 to make it clear
that the reciprocity provisions apply only to
deceased nonresidents of the United States
and that intangible property of sister state
residents are basically not subject to Cali-
fornia inheritance tax in any event. The
amendment therefore makes no actual change
in the law as presently interpreted.
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THE FREE SPEECH QUESTION
IN THE SUBSCRIPTION
TELEVISION CONTROVERSY
By Horace V. McNally, Jr.
1. Introduction
In July, 1964, a new form of entertain-
ment appeared in California as Subscription
Television, Inc. (STV). An idea which had
been discussed and debated for years became
a short- term reality as STY combined with
the Pacific and General Telephone companies
to transmit paid television into viewer's homes
via coaxial cable. These closed circuit pro-
grams offered a special attraction to the se-
lective television watcher for STY made
available shows and events which were not
able to be seen anywhere else on T.V.
But in order to present these hand-picked
shows which admittedly did not have mass
media appeal, STY had to rely on the rev-
enues produced by directly charging the in-
dividual subscriber, rather than sponsored
advertisements. This direct assessment of the
television viewer disturbed many people espe-
cially the independent theater owners who
envisioned their share of the public's dollar
measurably reduced by subscription television
competition. To combat this attack, the theater
owners introduced an initiative to Cali-
fornians.
The proposed law, entitled "An Act to
Preserve Free Television in California," was
extensively advertised and came to be com-
monly known as the "Free Television Act."
This Act outlawed the operation of subscrip-
tion television for home reception in this state.
On November 3, 1964, the voters of California
.adopted this initiative under the ballot desig-
nation of Proposition 15.
The California Supreme Court is now con-
sidering the question of whether such a pro-
hibition by legislation is valid, or whether it
abridges freedom of speech and expression
and is consequently invalid under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, and Article I, Section 9, of the
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California Constitution. This is the issue which
we shall consider here as it applies to STY.
Our treatment of it may seem one-sided, but
it is intended to be in order to examine a most
interesting facit of the case for STY.
II-Establishing the Right to Freedoms
Freedom of speech is expressly protected
by the First Amendment and is applied to
the individual states by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which also
assures "liberty" thus guaranteeing freedom
of expression. These freedoms are two of the
most basic and essential personal liberties pro-
tected from state infringement. The "liberty
of the press and of speech is within the
liberty safeguarded by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion
by state action. »i
The Constitution of the state of California
protects the same rights.2 But are these rights
which are clearly possessed by STY being
infringed upon by the Free T.V. Act? It ap-
pears that they are.
In the first place, a right to free speech
is an empty phrase without some effective
method of expressing one's ideas. So included
within the area of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections are the means by which
speech is communicated to others." Also en-
compassed is the content of the ideas trans-
mitted by the speech, for if this were changed,
free speech would again be no more than a
series of words."
It ·has been further established that broad-
casts over radio and television are entitled
.10 the protections of the First Amendment."
To hold otherwise would be to deny guaran-
teed freedoms to one of the most important
influencing forces in our society.
STY argues that the guaranteed protec-
tion of the Constitution are not lost or af-
fected merely because there is a charge made
for" the reception of television programs. G
Such 'a conclusion seems elementary for if
speech or press had to be cost free to be
protected, then motion pictures, books, news-
papers, and the like could no longer operate
within the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Such a conclusion is absurd.
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III-Restriction of Constitutional Rights
Now that the existence of STV's primary
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments have been explicated, the question fol-
lows whether STY can be deprived of these
rights or can they be restricted' by a ma-
jority of the voters.
Since we are concerned here with basic
constitutional rights, the fact that the voters
passed Proposition 15 does not remove the
Free T.V. Act from the light of the court's
examination. "One's right to life, liberty and
property, to free speech, a free press, free-
dom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to
a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections. m The court in the Barnette cases
explained that it is the very purpose of the
Bill of Rights to withdraw certain subjects
from the arena of political controversy and
"to place them beyond the reach of ma-
jorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the
courts."
In scrutinizing the restrictions put on STY
by the voters, the court must keep in mind
that the right to free speech and expression
cannot be hindered or prohibited by state law
unless there is a real danger present, and
even then only to the extent necessary to
abate that danger. The Supreme Court has
used various standards to control the actions
of the states in this area.
The first guide which was used by the
Supreme Court in relation to the First Amend-
ment freedoms was the "bad-tendency test."
In Gitlow vs. New York,9 the court said that
it is within thc proper exercise of the state
police power to punish those "who abuse this
freedom by utterances inimical to the public
morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public
peace . . ." So during that period of our
judicial history, the state could restrict free-
doms at the first indication that their exercise
would be harmful to the society at large. The
court has since abandoned this criteria.
The next standard applied was the "clear
and present danger test", which was origi-
nated by Justice Holmes.l"
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"The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring
about thesubstantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."
This test was modified in Bridges Vs. Cali-
[ornia.t? There the court emphasized that
when applying restrictions on free speech it
is not enough that a substantive evil will re-
sult, but that the evil must be "substantial".
The casc continued stating that the "substan-
tive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before
the utterances can be punished." "Only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion. "12
.Although this test has not been abandoned
by the court, it has been significantly re-
evaluated for the element of balancing has
been added. The court must now consider
"whether the gravity of any such evil, dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies in-
vasion of freedom of speech in order to
avoid the danger. "13 This is the criteria which
the court will use today. So if there is in fact
a prohibition of the f~eerloms of speech and
expression placed on STV, such restrictions
must be weighted by the court according to
the balancing standard.
To begin with, the state of California argues
that the Free T.V. Act does not prohibit sub-
scription television in homes, hut only pro-
vides that no charge be made for such tele-
casts. This, however, is just a technical con-
sideration. Forcing STY to provide free en-
. tertainment results in a de facto absolute pro-
hibition of STY. The Act has eliminated
STY's sole artery of revenue, and without
the ability to charge. the individual, STY
would be like a movie house unable to re-
quire admission. The films would have to be
shown free or not at all, and since the latter
alternative would bankrupt the owner, clos-
ing down would be the only solution.
Neither does the Act simply regulate the
business of STY in a reasonable and non-
discriminatory way. For example, the Fair
Labor Standards Act and National Labor Re-
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lations Act have been applied to the busi-
nesses of radio and television, but their en-
forcement does not prohibit the exercise of
personal freedoms. In addition, these acts
apply universally to the entire trade or busi-
ness. The Free T.V. Act goes much further
and completely denies operation to STV for
failure to comply with the state rule, while
at the same time, ,the Act specifically ex-
empts theater subscription television from its
confines.
IV-Validity of Restriction on
Constitutional Rights
Since such a prohibition against STV is
evidently in force under the Act, we must
determine whether this prohibition is valid
by the use of the balancing test. The main
problem is in discovering a real evil, for the
"evil" described by the state of California
and the advocates of Proposition 15 is largely
speculative and illusory.
The language of the Free T.V. Act itself is
vague and uninformative. It asserts that the
development of any subscription television
business would have an adverse effect upon
presently licensed TV. stations. What this
"adverse effect" is, or what its extent will
be has never been established, but has merely
been a matter for speculation. Indeed a read-
ing of the Report of Hearings on Subscription
television, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, con-
tains only a few mirage-like statements that
"subscription television may destroy some
free television operations." If such a fore-
most legislative body has no further idea than
this of the effects of subscription television,
then such shadows are hardly the substantive
evil which would justify a prohibition of
personal freedoms guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Act continues that subscription tele-
vision would "tend to" deprive the public
of their present freedom of choice regarding
T.V. programs, and that it would "tend to"
create a monopoly. It is difficult to imagine
how the adding of an additional three tele-
vision channels to an area and increasing the
viewer's choice will even remotely "tend to"
restrict freedom of choice. Nor does it ap-
pear possible that STV in 'its infant stage
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would have the power to create a monopoly,
if indeed it ever would have such a cap-
ability, which again is a matter of pure con-
jecture. Rather, it seems that the theater own-
ers are eliminating their competition by the
Free T.V. Act, thus creating their own mo-
nopoly. In any event, the Act itself is so
vague that the "evils" are certainly discounted
by the probability.
V-Related Problems
Several related considerations should also
be mentioned briefly. First, there is a ques-
tion whether the Free T.V. Act imposes 3.
prior restraint on speech and expression. If
the Supreme Court finds such a prior re-
straint, the law imposing it carries a strong
presumption of invalidity.l"
Second, it is argued that the Free T.V. Act
discriminates against STV and in favor of
the competing media by eliminating STV's
method of revenue, while leaving commercial
and theater T.V. untouched. It is contended
that this violates the constitutional provision
relatin9 to free expression.
Finally, STV argues that there should be
no total prohibition of a means of communi-
cating free speech .and expression unless it
is very clear that a less constricting method
would be ineffective. Even though the gov-
ernment might have a legitiment purpose in
imposing the restrictions, a broad means hin-
dering fundamental liberties should not be
used when a narrower method is available.l"
Fora example, in Soia vs. New York'" an
ordinance against sound trucks was held in-
valid because the law itself failed to specify
the standards to be used in applying. This
gave the enforcer absolute discretion, and
therefore it amounted to a total prohibition.
But if a more clearly selective and accurate
measure had been used, then the law could
be valid. The Free T.V. Act, however, pro-
hibits all subscription T.V. no matter how
small or at what capacity they are operating,
with the exception of theater television. But
if the stated purposes of the Act may be ac-
complished by less restrictive measures or
by traditional legal methods, then a total
elimination would be improper.!?
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VI-Conclusion
The foregoing is a sketch of the case for
STY. But the problems concerning the First
and the Fourteenth Amendment do not con-
stitute the entire controversy between STY
and the State of California, but only one part
of it.
The issues presented in this paper have al-
ready been decided in favor of STY in the
Superior COUIt of Sacramento County.l" and
the Supreme Court of California will be re-
viewing the case shortly. In the opinion of
the author, the decision should be affirmed
on the ground that the rights of STY to free
speech and expression have been unconsti-
tutionally infringed upon by the Free T.V.
Act.
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A.L.S.A. SUMMER CONVENTION
What is ALSA? ALSA is the American
Law Student Association. It is an organiza-
tion of over' 130 student bar associations
representing a majority of the law schools
in the United States. The purposes and ob-
jectives of this Association are: "1. To in-
troduce students to the professional prob-
lems and responsibilities they will face after
admission to the practice of law; 2. To
coordinate students projects and ideas for
initiating and improving activities of this
Association and its member organizations;
3. To promote the idea of professional re-
sponsibility and to acquaint law students with
the opportunities and obligations present to
serve the public and to improve the admini-
stration of justice through the organized Bar;
4. To acquaint law students with the nature
and activities of the American Bar Association
and of local and State bar associations; to
foster a closer relationship between the fu-
ture lawyers and present members of the legal
profession; and to train law students for
future participation in the American Bar As-
sociation, its Junior Bar Conference and the
local and State bar associations; 5. To initi-
ate and to promote the aforesaid activities
to the end that the best interests of the law
student and the legal profession are served. "1
ALSA is also directly beneficial to the
students of Loyola. We, as individual mem-
bers, automatically receive a copy of the
Student Lawyer Journal which is published
seven times during the school year. This in-
formative publication contains interesting as
well as informative articles and advise from
leading memhers of the bar. ALSA also pub-
lishes pertinent articles dealing with various
aspects of the profession and these are avail-
able in pamphlet form free to individual mern-
. bers. Such articles as "Two Tips On Writ-
ing Law Exams", "Practical Answers on the
First Years of Law Practice", "Today's Bar
Exam" and "The Government Lawyer and
The Law Clerk" are just a few of the many
pamphlets available. Additionaly, a low cost
life insurance is offered to members through
1. A.L.S.A. Const. art. I, § 2.
(Continued on page 31)
LOYOLA DIGEST
FRATERNITY ROW
PHI DELTA PHI
Phi Delta Phi offers the Loyola Law Stu-
dent an opportunity to participate in extra-
curricular activities as partial preparation
for assuming the responsibilities of the legal
profession. One might ask, "professional
preparation is fine, but what is a legal fra-
ternity going to do for me right now?" The
members of Phi Delta Phi, like all law stu-
dents, realize the importance of guiding be-
ginning students in writing law exams. One
of the prime factors for failure from Law
School is the inability of students to write
law examinations. This is the reason why Phi
Delta Phi upper classmen, who have reached
a high level of academic achievement, con-
duct seminar groups with Phi Delta Phi
pledges. The purpose of these small informal
seminars is to assist the beginning student
~n the art and skill of writing law examinat-
Ions.
Phi Delta Phis unselfishly give their serv-
ice to the Law School. Members of the fra-
ternity are active in student government, legal
writing programs, teaching fellowships, legal
periodicals and many other activities. In ad-
dition to this individual participation Phi
Delta Phi operates a Book Exchange at mod-
erate prices for the benefit of Loyola students.
Outstanding members of the legal pro-
fession will be invited to luncheons spon-
sored by Phi Delta Phi. This personal con-
tact with practicing attorneys, judges, and
leading legal authorities is a vital function
of a legal fraternity.
The social advantages to a legal fraternity
are certainly important. Social activities such
as cocktail parties, athletic events, and ex-
changes with local college sororities are vigor-
ously supported. However, these activities do
not dominate the Phi Delta Phi calendar. The
members of the fraternity realize social ac-
tivities ought to be secondary to academic
achievement.
It is the goal of Phi Delta Phi, through
professional and social activities, to supple-
ment a law student's education to prepare him
for professional responsibility, initiative, and
service to profession and community.
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PHI ALPHA DELTA
Like the explosion of a Roman candle on
the 4th of July, Phi Alpha Delta Legal Fra-
ternity is once again bursting forth with a
stellar program for the coming academic year.
An outstanding schedule of social and pro-
fessional activities is programmed to surpass
even last year's highly successful events.
Following the recognized objective that a
legal fraternity serves to aid the neophite
lawyer in preparation of becoming a digni-
fied member of a highly professional field,
P.A.D. presents a five-star formula to its
members in furtherance of this goal. The first
star represnts P.A.D.'s renowned academic
program; the second star shines just as bright-
ly in the socialibility area; the third star ties
the first two stars together by bringing a'
social approach to events hinged on absorb-
ing practical legal knowledge; the fourth star
stands for the life-blood of any fraternity its
rush program to gain new members; the last
star, but certainly not the dimest, is that of
activities in both school and community.
Members of Phi Alpha Delta are proud of
these goals, and justly so. They know that
when they graduate from law school they have
gained more than a mere "textbook" approach
to the legal profession. They have gained in-
valuable experience in the acceptance of re-
sponsibility in the community, and in turn,
to command the respect and dignity that every
attorney must learn to earn from his fellow
man.
Phi Alpha Delta offers what is perhaps one
. of the most successful seminar programs in
the country for its freshman pledges. Actives
are selected who have excelled in each fresh-
man course. They hold a week-end concave
where they present a hypothyical exam ques-
tion for each course, correct what they feel is
in error and attempt to give some insight to
the freshman of what Finals are like at
Loyola Law School. P.A.D. doesn't attempt
to give the student the correct "canned" an-
swer to any course, but only to give some
advance practice and aid on handling law
exams.
Also, as incentive for the upperclassmen,
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two scholastic awards are given annually by
Phi Alpha Delta. The national office gives a
plaque in honor of the highest accumulative
average obtained by a graduating P.A.D.
member. The local chapter annually awards
a set of California codes to the fr~hman mem-
ber with the highest average for' his first year
in law school.
Following the precedent set by last year's
members, Phi Alpha Delta has come through
with a schedule of social events geared to
meet the individual desires of the entire mem-
bership. The annual affairs include a wel-
come cocktail party, poker-beer bust, initia-
tion party, tri-chapter Christmas dance with
P.A.D. chapters at U.s.c. and U.C.L.A. and
the activiation dinner in the Spring.
Added to these annual events are a Hallo-
ween party, theatre venture, New Year's Eve
party, alumni-active stag party and to round
out the year, a Spring-formal.
It is in this area that members obtain some
of the most 'informative legal hints and knowl-
edge that may be gained outside of the class-
room. The format includes an afternoon lunch-
eon series with guest speakers, tours through
the Los Angeles Court system, and get-to-
gethers with alumni of the fraternity.
Last year's luncheon series concluded with
a highly successful affair at the Playboy Club,
and this year's program may prove to be even
more enjoyable. The theme is centered around
the practical questions of what field of law
and what type of firm should a beginning
attorney engage in.
The Court' Day Program serves as an in
troduction to the many different departments-
of the Los Angeles County Court System.
Members are taken from the basic filing de-
partments, through Law & Motion, actual.
court trial and even the morgue.
Highlight of the year is the annual P.A.D.
Judge's Night, an affair sponsored by alumni
of the fraternity. Here.is an excellent chance
for members to meet with practicing attor-
neys and judges of this area.
Phi Alpha Delta is the largest legal fra-
ternity at Loyola. It gained this honor by an
open rush program, whereby any and all
male students, who are inclined to do so,
may join. Combine this open invitation with
the varied program that P.A.D. offers to its
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members, and it is easy to see why 65 students
were pledged 'in 1964 alone.
1965 brings hopes of even a larger pledge
class, for the enthusiasm of the freshmen class
in ALL aspects of legal training is quite evi-
dent. P.A.D. is looking forward to seeing
many of these persons as members in the near
future.
Members of Phi Alpha Delta realize that
their obligation as a future part of the legal
profession does not end with the mere' join-
ing of a legal' fraternity. They should' take
part in other activities as well. This is demon-
strated aptly by looking to some student po-
sitions heldbyP.A.D.'s at Loyola. From class
representatives to co-editor of the Digest and
President of the Board of Bar Governors,
there is found a P.A.D. The same applies to
the Honor Roll, Teaching-Fellows and other
positions at school.
PHI DELTA DELTA
WOMEN LAW STUDENTS
During the Summer of 1965, the Women
Law Students of Loyola Law School reacti-
vated the Alpha Theta Chapter of Phi Delta
Delta Sorority for purposes of:
Permitting a close association of the wo-
men on campus in both day and evening di-
visions, and ,
Providing activities designed to acquaint the
women more fully with the practice of law
through informal discussions with prominent
women in various fields of legal practice.
The first event of the advent of the school
year will be a "Get Acquainted Pot Luck
Dinner" on October 3, 1965. Thereafter .:t
series of three informal dinner discussions are
planned for November, January, and March,
with such outstanding women as Judge Mil-
dred L. Lillie. .
The members of Phi Delta Delta wish to
extend a warm welcome to all the women law
students to join in the activities planned. No-
tice as to dates and time will be posted.
We wish all of the first year students the
best of luck in their studies in this academic
year.
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THOMAS MORE LAW SOCIETY
TMLS has been called the "Papist Under-
ground" of Loyola by some, especially if
someone by chance calls it the Saint Thomas
More Law Society. To those who hold this
opinion of the Society, this article may seem
a subterfuge. Actually TMLS is an associa-
tion which interests itself in the examination
of the human implications of the study and
practice of the law.
Students in the third and fourth year will
remember TMLS as the sponsor of periodic
luncheon-lectures. Newer students will have
far less acquaintance with TMLS. The history
of the Society, while an important tradition,
is not as important as its present plans and
organization.
Formally the membersh'ip of TMLS is stu-
dent body wide; Practical necessity, in view
of the objectives of the organization, precludes
holding a meeting at which all members are
present. Accordingly the destiny of the or-
ganization is directed by a steering committee
of limited membership.
This committee chooses subjects of interest
for its purposes, arranges to have an authority
on the subject meet with the Society, prepares
a file of background materials, and invites
interested students to attend the discussion.
TMLS is committed to a theory of partici-
pation and contribution. It is committed to a
seminar or symposium, as opposed to a lec-
ture approach. Those who attend these meet-
ings are expected not only to a bsorb, but to
produce helpful ideas.
This year's TMLS program will commence
with a discussion of proposed laws liberaliz-
ing permissible causes of abort ion.
"GET IN THERE, \VE'LL SUE FOR MILLIONS!"
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INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER
By Larry de Coster
I. Mental Presence
The California State Constitution provides
that the accused shall have the right to ap-
pear and defend a charge against him in per-
son and with his counsel.' Also, it is pro-
vided by statute that a person cannot be tried,
sentenced or punished while he is insane."
This has been interpreted by the courts to
mean that the defendant cannot be proceeded
against if he is not capable of understanding
the nature of the proceedings."
Defense counsel can raise this issue at
any time in the criminal proceedings by oral
or written motion to the court. The issue is
seldom raised prior to trial. When raised at
trial, the court has discretion as to whether
or not to suspend proceedings. That is, the
court must have a "doubt" as to the defend-
ant's mental state. Whether or not that doubt
exists is within the court's exercise of sound
discretion. It is helpful if the defense's motion
is accompanied by psychiatrists' affidavits. If
the affidavits raise a doubt, the trial court
must order a hearing.
The issue of mental presence is not en-
tirely clarified. It would apply if the defend-
ant did not understand the nature and pur-
pose of the proceedings or could not cooperate
with his counsel and thereby hinder his de-
fense. Governor Brown's Commission has
recommended that the rule be codified." It
recommends that if the court has a doubt
about the "defendant's competency to be pro-
ceeded against.?" then it should suspend all.
proceedings and order a hearing as to the
defendant's competency.
If the court orders a hearing, then a jury
trial is held to determine the defendant's
mental presence." The defense attorney can
put on psychiatric witnesses and the court may
appoint three psychiatrists to examine the
defendant.
The exact test involved here must be kept
in mind by defense counsel. The question is,
is the defendant unable to understand the na-
ture of the proceedings or is he unable to
cooperate with his counsel in the preparation
of the case. The defendant's mental state at
the time of the commission of the crime is
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irrelevant to this question. The psychiatrist
should be made aware of the test involved
and carefully briefed on it.
If the defendant is found to lack present
sanity, he will be committed to a state hos-
pital until recovery and a trial will be held
upon that recovery." The length of commit-
ment will be determined by the superintend-
ent in charge of the hospital. 8 However, a writ
of habeus corpus isavailableif defense counsel
thinks that further commitment is not called
for, in which event another hearing is held.
The main danger here is that the defendant
may be committed for a period of time great-
er than he would receive if found guilty.
Therefore, the defense should carefully con-
sider the use of this procedure and then use
it only when the need is clearly apparent.
II. DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
As previously noted, upon a plea of not
guilty, the defendant is tried upon the issue
of guilt. Evidence as to insanity is not ad-
missable at this trial as it is not in issue.
This rule, inadmissibility of evidence as to
insanity, has been altered by the California
Supreme Court in two cases: People v. Welis"
and People v. Corshen.t"
In People v. Wells, the defendant was
charged with assault upon a prison guard.
He entered a double plea. On the trial on
the issue of guilt, he sought to introduce evi-
dence of physicians who had observed ob-
jective manifestations by the defendant. From
these manifestations, it could be inferred that,
because he was suffering from an abnormal
physical and mental condition not amounting
to insanity at the time he injured the guard,
he acted not with malice aforethought but
under fear for his personal safety and in the
honest belief that he was defending him-
self from attack by prison officers. The evi-
dence was not offered to prove self-defense
but was offered solely in relation to the spe-
cific mental state which was put in issue by
the charge and a not guilty plea. The trial
court refused to allow the evidence and the
defendant appealed to the California Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reversed and said
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that while the code precludes testimony on
the insanity issue presented on the trial of
the issue of guilt, such legislation cannot be
construed as permitting the
... prosecution to adduce evidence to prove
a specific mental state essential to the crime
and at the same time precluding the defend-
ant from adducing otherwise competent and,
material evidence to' disprove such particu-
lar mental state, short of evidence of legal
insanity, ... "
In People v. Gorshen, the defendant, a
longshoreman working the night shift, had
shot and killed his foreman following a fight
that arose when the defendant was sent home
from work for drinking on the job. The de-
fendant introduced psychiatric testimony tend-
ing to show that he had delusions concern-
ing his sexual capacity; that he had come to
regard his ability as a worker as proof of his
sexual capacity; and that the foreman's treat-
ing him as unfit for work amounted in his
mind to treating him as a sexual pervert. The
evidence tended to show that this threatened
Gorshen's whole personality' balance and that
in this condition he was unable to premedi-
tate and deliberate, a state of mind required
for the first degree murder charge against
him. He was convicted of second degree
murder. The Supreme Court held that the
evidence was properly received, and said:
Such expert evidence, like evidence of un-
consciousness resulting from voluntary in-
toxication, is received not as a "complete
defense" negating capacity to' commit any
crime but as a "partial defense" negating
specific mental state essential to"a particular
crime. . ., The inquiry to' be made is
whether the crime which the defendant is
accused of having committ-ed has in point of
fact been committed, and ror this purpose
whatever will fairly and legitimately lead to'
the discovery of the mental conditton and
status of the accused at the time, may be
given in evidence to the jury, and may be
considered by them in determining whether
the defendant was in. fact guilty of the crime
charged against him.12
The rule enunciated by the California Su-
preme Court does not imply that the. de-
fendant may show that he is mentally ill in
a limited way. It means that because of his
mental state at the time of the commission
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of the crime, he is not fully accountable and
can therefore only be found guilty of a lesser
offense. It is not a complete negation of guilt.
If the defendant is charged with assault with
intent to kill and he shows that he lacked the
specific intent to kill, he will then be guilty
of assault with a deadly weapon. As the Su-
preme Court noted in the Gorshen case,
diminished responsibility operates in much
the same way as the defense of intoxication;
it reduces the charge but does not negate
guilt of any crime. The jury instruction on
this issue is:
You are reminded that a person might be
legally sane, as we define that term in deal-
ing with the question of criminal responsi-
bility, and yet be in an abnormal mental Dr
nerVDUScondition: and because of such CDn-
dition he might be less likely Dr unable to'
have or to' hold a specific intent Dr a certain
state of mind, which is an essential ingre-
dient of a certain .crime. We have received
evidence bearing on the mental and nerVDUS
condition of the defendant at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime charged.
Such evidence may be considered by you in
determining whether Dr not defendant did
any act charged against him and, if so,
whether Dr not, at that time, there existed
in him the specific mental ractor and intent
which must accompany that act to consti-
tute a certain crime or degree of crime. YDU
do not have before YDUany issue as to de-
fendant's legal sanity.13
What happens is that to' the traditional doc-
trine of mens rea is added a "more realistic
and scientific appraisal of pathological be-
havior than currently obtains."?"
This calls for a re-examination of the doc-
trine of mens rea. Concepts such as malice
aforethought, purpose, design, intent-to kill,
etc. are broadened.
Each of these archaic phrases arose out of
attempts by the law to judge the psychology
of the doer as well as condemn the criminal
deed. It should be possible through collabora-
tive effort of both the law and the behavioral
. sciences, especially psychiatry, to' redefine
arid reinterpret these ancient phrases to'
make modern psychological and social sense)"
This rule of diminished responsibility hac;
not yet been fully developed. It appears as
though more and more defense attorneys are
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using it as a matter of course. This creates
distrust among prosecutors and they treat it as
"a maneuver to evade punishment."?" Too
many psychiatrists are using it as a vehicle to
get across their ideas that every criminal is
mentally sick and should not be punished.
This atmosphere creates little opportunity for
a solid development and valid exploitation of
the rule.
It should be emphasized that the "dimin-
ished responsibility" rule is never a: total de-
fense. For example, if the defendant is found
guilty of homicide, the jury, or the court if
a jury is waived, must find the degree of the
crime of which the defendant is guiltyY
Governor Brown's Commission has recom-
mended codification of the rule and would im-
pose procedural limits on its use. IS It recom-
mends that if expert testimony is to be intro-
duced by the defense, notice should be given.
Also, if the jury finds that the defendant
lacked the specific intent due to the applica-
tion of the rule, it should return a separate
verdict to that effect.
It should be noted that if the charge is re-
duced because the jury finds that the de-
fendant lacked the requisite intent, the de-
fendant is not committed to a mental institu-
tion. He is sentenced on the lesser offense·
and after serving that sentence is let loose
among society. Therefore, the Commission
recommends that upon a separate verdict by
the jury on diminished responsibility, the de-
fendant should be committed and not released
until it is determined that he is not a danger
to society.
Diminished responsibility gives the attorney
a lot of leeway in the use of psychiatric evi-
dence. It also gives the psychiatrist more free-
dom in forming his opinions and expressing
them on the witness stand.
III. THE McNAGHTEN RULE
In People v. Wolff, the California Supreme
Court reaffirmed the McNaghten rule. It
. stated that the rule is that of California Jury
Instructions - Criminal, #801 (revised),
which reads:
Insanity, as the word is used in these in-
structions, means a diseased or deranged
condition of the mind which renders a person
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incapable of knowing or understanding the
nature and quality' of his act, or unable to
distinguish right from wrong in relation to
that act.
The test Of sanity is this: First, did the de-
fendant have sufficient mental capacity to
know and understand that it was wrong and
a violation of the right of another? To be
sane and thus responsible to the law for the
act committed, the defendant must be able
both to know and understand the nature and,
quality of his act and to distinguish be-
tween right. and wrong at the time of the
commission of the otrense.
The court went on to say that "the Mc-
Naghten test has become an integral part of
the legislative scheme for the appraisal of
criminal responsibility in California and any
change therein should come from the legis-
lature. "l9
As already seen, this is a restrictive rule as
to the extent and the use of psychiatric evi-
dence. The psychiatrist does not really testify
as a psychiatrist. He has a difficult time
coping with the rule.
Each expert must justify his own use of
it. Many of the differences apparent in the
"battle of the experts" revolve about the
meaning of the word "know" in the Me-
Naghten formula. If interpreted very strictly,
then almost every defendant, no matter how
mentally ill, knows that what he did was
wrong. Under a strict definition, the only
persons who are so mentally ill that they
do not know this are a few tar-deteriorated
... and far-advanced psychotics (who) are
hardly capable of acting on aggressive im-
pulses even if they existed.
If, however, "know" is interpreted to mean
"comprehend," to know right and wrong in
terms of their social, moral, and emotional
ramrncations then, indeed, few defendents
would be sane and responsible.so
D-O psychiatrists are apt to' give a strict in-
terpretation to the McNaghten rule and
analytic-psychologic psychiatrists tend to be
very broad in their interpretation.
As a result of these difficulties, the "not
guilty by reason of insanity" plea is seldom
used and then only in capital offense cases
where highly competent attorneys are in-
volved.
Governor Brown's Commission has recom-
mended that the rule be substituted with:
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A person is not criminally responsible for
an act, if, at the time of the commtsston of
the act, as a substantial consequence of men-
tal disorder, he did not have adequate capaci-
ty to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law he is alleged to have
vtolated.st
The Commission explains the rule in a very
careful analysis of the terminology used r'"
"Not criminally responsible" eliminates the
label of criminal from a defendant falling
within the test.
"At the time of the commission of the act"
points out that the test applies to the time of
the crime rather than to the mental state of
the defendant at some other time.
"A substantial consequence" points out that
the mental disorder must be the primary fac-
tor leading to lack of responsibility. "Con-
sequences" 'is thought by the Commission to
be a more meaningful tag than "product,"
as used in the Durham rule, or "result" or
"offspring." A causual relation must exist
between the mental state of the defendant and
his conduct and that relation must be a sig-
nificant one. "Sustantial" is also used in order
to eliminate minor mental disorders from con-
sideration.
"He did not have adequate capacity to
conform" points to responsibility, to the ques-
tion of whether or not the defendant was cap-
able of conforming his conduct to the require-
ments of the law.
"Law he is alleged to have violated" is
designed to create a connection with the spe-
cific crime for which the defendant is charged.
This would eliminate a general consideration
of the defendant's mental state, it would di-
vert attention from the personal moral stand-
ards of the defendant.
Lastly, "mental disorder" is defined as
any "mental disease, defect, or other condi-
tion." The Commission states that:
. . . in our opmlOn, in view of our present
limited knowledge, it would be unwise and
improper to attempt, by statute or by ju-
dicial decision, to define precisely that which
_is a question of fact--mental disorder. This
becomes even clearer when it is emphasized
that, in the last analysis, it is not the de-
scription of the defendarrt's mental condition
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which is controlling: The crucial issue is the
effect that this mental condition has 011 the
defendant's capacity to control his conduct.s"
The Commission's test is presently being
studied by the Senate Interim Committee on
the Judiciary and by the Assembly Interim
Committee on Criminal Procedure. These
committees received the recommendation in
1963, and there has been favorable comment
on it in the Assembly Committee.
If the Commission's rule is adopted, it is
certain that the area of availability of in-
sanity as a defense will be greatly broadened.
Whether or not it will be utilized remains
to be seen. It might well be that it is a great
ado about nothing when it appears that the
diminished responsibility rule is here to stay.
The Commission's test has only one advantage
over the diminished responsibility rule, it is 11
total defense. On the other hand, it has a dis-
advantage. A finding of insanity results in
commitment in a mental institution, while a
finding of diminished responsibility results in
a lesser sentence in a penal institution. It
might well be that the Commission's recom-
mendation will be used only in the same type
of cases as the McNaghten rule is used, capi-
tal offense cases.
FOOT NOTES
1. Calif. Constitution Act 1 § 13.
2. Cal. Penal Code § 1367.
3. People v. Berling, 115 Cal. App. 2d 255, 251 P. 2d
1017 (1953).
4. Second Report, 40.
5. Ibid. •
6. Cal. Penal Code § 1368.
7. Cal. Penal Code § 1370, 1372.
8. Cal. Penal Code § 1372.
9. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P. 2d 53 (1949).
10. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 492 (1959).
11. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 346.
12.51 Cal. 2d 7)6, 727-728.
13. Calif. Jury Instructions-Criminal.
14. C.E.B., 623. .
15. C.E.B., 624.
16. Cal. Penal Code § 1157.
17. Leavy; Psychiatry and Crimhr«! Laui: The Lawyer's
Role, 39 'Los Angeles B. Bull. 113 (1964). (Here-
inafter cited as Leavy).
18. Second Report, 16-17.
19. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 803.
20. C.E.B., 621-622.
21. First Report, -rs,
22. First Report, 48-51.
23. First Report, 50.
17
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
by Dennis M erenbach
The regional rounds for the National Moot
Court Competition will take place on No-
vember 16th and 17th, 1965, at the Los
Angeles County Court House, 111 N. Spring
Street. Loyola Law School will be repre-
sented by Patrick Lynch, Lola McAlphine, and
Dennis Merenbach.
Each school that participates in the com-
petition receives an identical transcript of the
Moot Court problem. This year the two basic
issues are in the areas of Constitutional Law
and Conflicts of Law.
The plaintiff in the case is Penelope H.
Iffington, a citizen of the State of Blackacre,
who is represented by P. Y. Maison. The de-
fendant is Floyds of Whiteacre, an insurance
company having its principal place of busi-
ness in the State of Whiteacre. Jack Risko-
vitch is President of Floyds of White acre, and
retained the firm of Hound and Hardhart to
defend the corporation.
The defendant issued a personal liability
policy to Gertrude Gonzales, the roommate of
Penelope Iffington. This policy was person-
ally delivered to Miss Gonzalez in the State
of Blackacre by Jack Riskovitch. Floyds of
Whiteacre is an unauthorized foreign insurer
within the meaning of the Blackacre Insurance
Code.
The plaintiff and Miss Gonzalez planned a
vacation to the State of Caribbeana. Within
one hour of their arrival in Caribbeana, it is
alleged that Miss Gonzalez negligently caused
the contents of her pocketbook to be spilled,
as a result of which a pen-size tear gas gun
contained therein was discharged which in-
jured the plaintiff.
There is a statute III Caribbean a that al-
lows an injured party, at his option, to bring
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legal action directly against the insurer of the
policy holder responsible for that injury.
There is no statute in Blackacre and under
Blackacre law an injured party can not sue
the alleged wrongdoer's insurer until a judg-
ment has been obtained against the wrong-
doer and remains unsatisfied for more than
thirty days.
The plaintiff filed suit in the United States
District Court, District of Blackacre. The ac- ,
tion was instituted ,pursuant to the direct
action statute of Caribbeana. The complaint
made reference to diversity of citizen-
ship and a controversy' exceeding the sum
of $10,000.00 (exclusive of interests and
costs), and allegations necessary for a negli-
gence cause of action.
The defendant's reply was a motion pur-
suant to Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure dismissing the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
the direct action state of Caribbean a did not
apply.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion
for an order pursuant to the Blackmore In-
surance Code. This code requires a defendant
to deposit or file with the Clerk of the Court,
cash or securities or the bond of a surety to
equal the alleged damages, or procure a
license to do an insurance business in the
State of Blackacre. The code further provides
that an unauthorized foreign insurer cannot
file any .pleading until this condition is met.
The District Court considered both mo-
tions and ruled in favor of the defendant's
motion and held the Blackacre Insurance
statute unconstitutional. The plaintiff ap-
pealed this decision on the basis that the
court erred on both motions.
The conflicts of law issue presented by
the defendant's motion required the court to
apply either the law of the state where the
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KENNEDY MOOT COURT ROOM
Loyola to take part in regional rounds for the National Moot Court Competition which
will take place November 16-17, 1965 at the Los Angeles County Court House.
lllJury occurred (Carribbeana), or the law
of the state of the forum .(Blackacre). As
Blackacre had not yet developed a conflict of
law rule for this issue, the District Court de-
cided to apply the "grouping of contacts"
tests adopted by the State of New York in
BABCOCK v. JACKSON, 'I2 N.Y. '2d 473,
191 N.E. 2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). The tradi-
tional rule that the place of the injury desig-
nates the law to be applied was rejected. If
the Court of Appeals sustains the application
of the BABCOCK test, then the issue will be
whether the test of weighing each state's
interest was applied correctly.
The motion of the plaintiff was denied by
the District Court on grounds that the Black-
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acre Insurance State was unconstitutional.
The court was persuaded by the financial in-
ability of the defendant to post the required
security or to obtain a license to do an in-
surance bus'iness in Blackacre. The financial
inability of the defendant would result in a
default if the plaintiff's motion was granted.
See DEZELL v. E. E. BLACK, LTD., 191
F. Supp. 635 (D. Cuam 1961).
The Loyola Moot Court Team will submit
a brief 0)1 behalf of the appellant, Penelope
H. Iffington. However, the team must be pre-
pared to argue in favor of either appellant or
respondant. The side to be argued is disclosed
to the team a few minutes before the argu-
ments begin.
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AN OPTIONAL TAX FABLE
by Clemente Smith and Donald W. Cowen*
Professors of Law, Loyola Law School
Once upon an April 15 there were t~o
young income taxpayers n~med T~xwI~e
and Otherwise. They lived side by side In
the tabulated land of the District Director of
the Internal Revenue Service. Fortune, in the
form of Form 1040, smiled on Taxwise. For-
tune, in the form of Form 1040, frowned on
Otherwise.
Taxwise dwelt in a modest cottage with his
unemployed wife and his dependent mother.
His wife bore him a son on December 31 of
the first year of their marriage. Taxwise could
take an exemption for his son for that year.
Otherwise dwelt in a modest cottage with his
unemployed wife and his dependent sister.
His wife bore him a son on the day after
December 31 of the first year of their mar-
riage. Otherwise could not take an exemption
for his son for that year.
Taxwise was self-employed and earned
$4,600 in one year. He spent $101 that year
for the the tools of his trade. His income tax,
with his four exemptions, came to $238.
Otherwise was an employee and earned
$4,500 in the same year. He spent $101 that
year for the tools of his trade. His income
tax, with his four exemptions, came to $247.
Taxwise, in a single year, made an inven-
tion and sold the patent for a $1,000 gain.
This transaction added $500 to his taxable
income. Otherwise, in the same year, wrote
a story and sold the copyright for a $1,000
gain. This transaction added $1,000 to his
taxable income.
-'I'axwise sold his modest cottage at a profit.
He spent the money for another cottage into
which he and his family moved one day be-
fore a year had passed. The profitthat Tax-
wise made on this sale was not a taxable -gain.
Otherwise sold his modest cottage at a profit.
He spent the money for another cottage into
which he and his family moved one day after
a year had passed. The profit that Otherwise
made on this sale was a taxable gain.
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It befell that Mrs. Taxwise divorced Tax-
wise and the court gave her the custody of
thei; minor son. In accordance with their
agreement, Taxwise paid Mrs. Taxwise $50
a month for support, to be reduced to $25 a
month when their son reached 21. Taxwise
was allowed a tax deduction of $50 a month.
It befell that Mrs. Otherwise divorced Other-
wise and the court gave her the custody of
thei; minor son. In accordance with their
agreement, Otherwise paid Mrs. Otherwise
$25 a month for. support and $25 a month
for support of their son until he reached 21.
Otherwise was allowed a tax deduction of $25
a month.
After divorce, Taxwise continued to live
with his mother and pay for more than half
of her support. In one year his mother earned
$599. Taxwise could take, an exemption for
his mother that year. After divorce Other-
wise continued to live with his sister and pay
for more than half of her support. In one year
his sister earned $600. Otherwise could not
take an exemption for his sister that year.
The mother of Taxwise became ill and un-
able to work at 65. Her $50 doctor's bill was
deductible by Taxwise. The sister of Other-
wise became ill and unable to work at 65.
Her $50 doctor's bill was not deductible by
Otherwise,
The dependent mother of Taxwise qualified
him to use a lower tax rate schedule as Head
of Household. This continued to be true even
. after they quarreled and Taxwise moved his
mother into separate housing. The dependent
sister of Otherwise qualified him to use a
lower tax rate schedule as a Head of House-
hold. This ceased to be true after they quar-
reled and Otherwise moved his sister into
separate housing.
o Tax, Where Is Tliy=Certainiy?
Once upon an April 15 there were two old
income taxpayers. They died side by side in
the tabulated land of the district Director.
Only one thing is certain in this world, my
children. It's not taxes. [The End]
':'Reprint from THE TAX MAGAZINE, May 1965
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THE MAN FROM U.N.C.L.E.
by Janet Chubb
Agent 007 peered cautiously into the dusty
volume. Could this be the tome that contained
the information necessary to crack his case?
As an agent (See Corpus Juris Secundum
on principal-agent relation) for the leading
research organization in the country, it was
his responsibility to see that not detail or pos-
sibility was left unexamined as he searched
for his objective-a case in point. In fact,
this was the most important aspect of his
job, for failure would mean a victory for
F.E.R.N.E., (factors eventually revealing non
efficiency) his opponent in this litigation. He
could see her now, extremely attractive with
her flowing blonde hair and subtle green suit,
as she systematically leafed through the vol-
umes of law. Opposition of this nature gen-
erally presented no problem to 007, but when
it involved points of law, Ferne was as deadly
with a Shepard's as any of his less appealing
opponents.
James Bond (see A.L.R. 2d under stock or
share), for 007 was merely a code (see
United States or California Civil), evaluated
the possibilities which lay open to him in the
area of combat preparation called the law
library. Having already determined the legal
issues, Bond was ready to begin his search
for law that would establish and verify his
contentions. The possibilities open to him
seemed endless, but stamina was one trait
necessarily found in the detectives of his or-
ganization, U.N.C.L.E., (the United Network
command for Legal efficiency).
The only clue he had was' the last word
which the "74.9" man had uttered, "survival."
He glanced at the reference works paneling
the walls, picked up the Permanent Edition,
Words & Phrases, edited by West Publishing
Company, and thumbed through to the word
"survive." He found a quantity of valuable in-
formation, including definitions, fields where
the term might be applicable, and cross ref-
erences, in addition to specific cases where
this subject might be relevant.
Having evaluated these possibilities and
taken down the important cases, he turned
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next to the encyclopedias, Corpus Juris a~d
Corpus Juris Secundum, whose. coverage in-
cluded the entire body of American law, and
to American Jurisprudence and American
Jurisprudence 2d, whose volumes contained
especially helpful footnotes. He then scann~d
the local encyclopedias in an attempt to aVOId
overlooking even the smallest clue.
Bond next sought out the legal periodicals
for possible authority in the field: includi~g
foreign articles as well as do~estlc. The in-
formation available was easily located as
nearly all the articles were Iisted both by
subject and author in the Index to Legal
Periodicals.
After noting Ferne's progress as she, pur-
sued her extensive research, he proceeded to
investiaate two primary digests, McKinney's
New C~lifornia Digest and West' s Calitor~ia
Digest checkinz subject matter and picking
out relevant cas~ citations as he pursued this
material. He then sought help from A.L.R.
and A.L.R. Zd, acknowledged to be the most
comprehensive and compact restatements of
American Law.
Collecting the case references he had sorted
out of the 'encyclopedias, digest, he loca~ed
each case in the reports, noting parallel CIta-
tions in the unofficial reports for later use
in his brief.
He appreciated the fact that the Nati?nal
Reporter System was keyed to t~e Amenca~
Digest System as this enabled him to !?o di-
rectly from his references in the Decennials to
the cases he anticipated would be relevant.
He carefully checked local, state and federal
sources as his jurisdiction was unlimited.
Having exhausted the realms of research,
Bond & Ferne each felt his side might win.
Victory or defeat hung in the balance of a
decision soon to be handed down by the Ap-
pellate Court. Bond and Ferne both :va~ted
anxiously. outside a drab, gray building,
squeezed into a shadowy valley in San Fran-
cisco. Out of this publishing house would soon
come the latest advance sheet with the decis-
ion for which each of the two expert research-
ers waited.
(Continued on page 31)
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BOARD OF BAR GOVERNORS
by Ronald M. Cohen
The first year freshman class was intro-
duced to the law school at an evening orienta-
tion program presented by the Board of Bar
Governors. The session which commenced with
an introductory talk by Dean J. Rex Dibble
consisted of separate
discussion . groups
lead by student fel-
lows in small semi-
nars on topics rang-
from legal' ethics
to study aids. This
program which re-
ceived the highest
recommenda t ion s
from those who par-
ticipated will be con-
tinued in the coming
years in the hopes that the incoming classes
will be easier able to adapt to the demands of
law school and that there will be a marked
decrease in the attrition rate.
The senior placement brochure is in the
process of publication and should be in dis-
tribution by the fourth week in October. The
brochure is a pamphlet published by the
senior graduating class and contains pictures
and resumes of all graduates along with
awards achieved and work experiences. The
brochure is sent to all prospective employers
and legal agencies, introducing the class of
1966 to the legal community. The benefits of
this program in the past years have been in-
valuable and has been a model for similar
efforts undertaken in many schools through-
out the country.
The American Law Students Association
convention was held in Miami, Florida Aug-
ust 7-12 and was attended by Burleigh Brew-
er, second year day class representative, and
myself. The convention is a gathering of dele-
gates representing the associated membership
of some 7500 law students of all the accredit-
ed schools throughout the country. The con-
vention provided prominent speakers on the
subjects of Forensic Pathology, anti-Trust in
the baseball world, and trial practices and
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techniques. There were numerous opportuni-
ties for workship discussions in which prob-
lems common to all law schools were com-
mented on and solutions shared amongst dele-
gates from different geographical areas.
Loyola's representatives took an active part
in all the meetings and provided examples
for other starting schools to utilize and con-
structive suggestions for the larger schools,
benefiting them from our experiences. Bur-
leigh Brewer was elected chairman of the
Audio Visual committee and is in charge of
collecting, publishing and disseminating films
and literature of legal interest to the nations
schools. This initial introduction into the na-
tional organization will pave the way for fu-
ture responsibilities in leading the efforts of
the ALSA to achieve its potential of 55,000
membership, representing every law student
in America.
The foremost project under the auspices of
the Board of Bar Governor's is the revamp-
ing of the legal publication, Loyola Law
School's Legal Digest. This beginning innova-
tion, changing the format from that of a
throwaway paper into a professional hand-
book, is of major importance in establishing
Loyola into a leader on the local and na-
tional scene. The digest is dedicated to pre-
senting educational and informative materials
to the lawyer and law school. Under the Co-
editorship of Roger Franklin and Joseph
Di Loretto, the Digest has been re-born into
a substantial review of general information
on the changes and revisions of selected topics
of interest. The alumni of Loyola will find
Blackstone's Commentaries will keep them
up to date as to the goings on and where-
abouts of long lost classmates. The student
will find fraternal and organization informa-
tion as well as forthcoming plans and pro-
grams concerning the law school. We hope
that this new presentation will become an
important asset to the student and practition-
er; it is our contribution to the ever import-
ant need for continuing education.
The coming months will see an increased
noon lecture series, a second and expanded
Issue of the Legal Digest, a Spring dance to
(Continued on page 31)
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THE CASE AGAINST PROSECUTION DISCOVERY
By Norman Montrose
In Jones Superior Court, the petitioner had
been charged with rape. On the day set for
trial, he was successful in gaining a con-
tinuance on the ground that he needed fur-
ther time to collect medical evidence per-
taining to his alleged impotency which was
result of injuries he had allegedlysustained
several years prior thereto. Within a week,
the prosecution filed a motion to discover the
names of all physicians the defendant in-
tended to call as witnesses in reference to his
alleged impotency, the names of any phy-
sicians who had treated the defendant for his
purported injury inflicted impotency and
finally all reports and x-rays ever taken in
connection with this injury. The trial court
granted this motion over objection. The pe-
titioner in his effort to restrain the order
through a writ of prohibition asserted that
the discovery order violated the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
California Constitution.'
Relying heavily on the fact that the alibi
statutes (statutes which require a defendant
to plead the defense of alibi or insanity and
to disclose in advance of trial the names of
witnesses he will call as to these defenses)
found in some 14 states had been consistently
'upheld as non-violative of the local privilege
against self-incrimination, a divided court
ruled the prosecution is entitled to discover
the names of witnesses the defendant intends
to call and all materials he intends to intro-
duce into evidence. However, the court grant-
ed the writ of prohibition since the discovery
order went beyond the permissible limits.
The question now becomes .what is the
meaning and extent of this decision? Unfor-
tunately, there has been no appellate decis-
ion directly involving the issue in Jones in
the almost three years since the latter has been
handed down." A recent article by Chief Jus-
tice Traynor (who wrote the majority opin-
ion in Jones) which discusses this decision
adds no illumination to what is contained
within the case itself."
According to Jones, the prosecution may
then discover the names of the witnesses the
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defense "intends to call" and all materials
the defense "intends to 'introduce in evidence."
Well then, how does the prosecution learn
what witnesses are intended to be called and
what is intended to be introduced as evidence?
Presumptively the defense could be compelled
to disclose this in advance of trial or the
J ones decision would have no meaning be-
cause a defense attorney would hardly ever
openly disclose this and thus submit to dis-
covery without compulsion.
Jn many if not most instances, due to the
brevity of time between his retention and
trial, a defense attorney will not know until
the time of trial every witness he will call
and every stitch of evidence he will seek to
introduce into evidence. Therefore, a defense
attorney will have only a general idea as to
these matters until very shortly before time
of trial.
The Jones holding granting the prosecu-
tion the right of discovery against a defendant
is the first and only decision of its kind."
Up until Jones V. Superior Court, it was just
tacitly assumed in dicta by the various courts
without comment that the defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination prevented the
prosecution from having the right of dis-
covery.
Representative samples of this assumption
is found in the following three cases: In
State V. Rhoades", it was declared that "The
state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar
to submit his private papers or memoranda
to the state for use or even examination, for
he cannot be required to testify in the case,
nor to furnish evidence against himself . . ."
While in United States V. Garrison et al, G
Learned Hand stressed that " ... Under our
criminal procedure the accused has every ad-
vantage while the prosecution is held rigid-
ly to the charge, he need not disclose the
barest outline of his defense. He is im-
mune from question or comment on his si-
lence .•. " Finally, the recent case of State
v. Tune" firmly stated that " ... in view of
the defendant's constitutional and statutory
protections against self-incrimination, the
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state has no right whatsoever to demand an
inspection of any of his documents or to take
his deposition, or to submit interrogatories to
him . . ." Now the dicta from these three
cases can hardly be considered as pillars of
authority against the ruling found in Jones.
Nevertheless, they emphasize the fact that
modern judicial thinking has and apparently
still considers the right of discovery in the
prosecution as definitely violative of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. ,
Perhaps more in point, the Jones 'decision
rejected long standing California authority
which put the self-incrimination privilege up-
on the highest legal plateau while stressing
that the privilege could in no way be violated.
In Ex Parte Cohen,8 one Louis Cohen was
called by the prosecution in a criminal ac-
tion to testify concerning an alleged election
fraud. Cohen refused to answer the questions
put to him on the ground that by answering
them, he would incriminate himself. Cohen's
contempt citation was affirmed on the basis
of an immunity from prosecution statute.
Nevertheless, the court put-forth the first sue-
cint delineation regarding California's con-
stitutional safeguard against self-incrimina-
tion. In this regard, the court at page 527
declared
" ... the object of the provision is the
immunity of the individual from compulsory
self-accusation. "The provision that a person
shall not be compelled in a criminal case to
be a witness 'against himself' is to be con-
strued as protecting him from being com-
pelled to give a.ny evidence which in a crimi-
nal prosecution against himself might in any
degree tend to establish the offense with
which he may be charged . . ." (emphasis
added)
In accord with the adamant position stated
in Ex Parte Cohen is the fairly recent case of
People V. Tolle" which was cited extensively
in the dissent to Jones. This was a prosecu-
tion for first degree murder wherein the
prosecution called as its first witness the
defendant. The defandant's refusal to take
the stand during the presentation of the prose-
cution's case brought numerous comments
from the District Attorney., In reversing the
conviction, the District Court of Appeal stated
that this procedure or method undertaken
by the prosecutor violated the defendant's
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constitutional and statutory guarantees against
self-incrimination; The major reasons for this
conclusion were as follows:
"It will be noted that under these con-
stitutional and statutory provisions the right
of the defendant to remain silent is absolute.
_ .. "Under a proper interpretation of these
quoted provisions, an accused has the rightto stand mute, clothed in the presumption
of innocence, until the prosecution, at the
trial has made out a prima facie case against
him. Until this has been done it is improper
to even comment on his silence."
As the Jones Court indicated, there is also
California authority to the effect that a de-
fendant need not produce documents in his
possession because this would be violative of
his privilege against self-incrimination. For
example, in People V. Chapman,lo it was
fervently asserted that " ... It is axiomatic
that the court cannot compel the defendant
in a criminal case to produce any incriminat-
ing writing . . ." The majority opinion of
J ones goes to great lengths to state that its
ruling was neither contrary to the established
authority in California nor like authority
which prevailed throughout the United States.
This conclusion being based on the fact that
they would allow prosecution discovery only
to the extent that the defendant intended to
'call or intended to introduce as evidence.
However, as was pointed out in reference to
the Rex hypothetical, this formula is more
apparent than real in preventing self incrimi-
nation in the context of discovery by the
prosecution. True, there may be instances
where the formula for allowing the discovery
would 'work no unjust results. However, in
the great majority 'of cases, there would re-
sult little more than a wholesale fishing ex-
pedition by the prosecution into the defend-
ant's materials which may be self-incriminat-
ing. I suggest that this result is contrary to
the great American legal tradition which ex-
isted even before the adoption of the United
States Constitution in 1789, namely that a
defendant in a criminal action need not be a
witness against himself.
The Jones decision relied very heavily upon
the several decisions in other jurisdictions
which held their respective alibi statutes were
not in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. These alibi statutes in general
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require the defendant in a criminal prose-
cution to disclose before trial the particular
alibi he is going to rely upon if any plus a
detailed factual account which gives rise to
the alibi. A few states in addition require the
names of supporting witnesses.
The penalties for non-compliance by the
defendant are similar in all of the jurisdic-
tions having such a statute in the sense that
evidence for such an alibi defense may be
excluded at trial in the discretion of the trial
judge. However, some states require manda-
tory exclusion. California refused to pass an
alibi statute in 1961Y Under the present
California statutory scheme, except for giv-
ing the prosecution notice of the defense of
insanity and pleading double jeopardy, a de-
fendant need not provide the prosecution no-
tice of or plead any other defenses he may
rely upon.P The Jones decision specifically
cited the following cases in reference to up-
holding local alibi statutes which in turn
'were cited as authority for giving the prose-
cution the right of discovery in California.
State V. Thayer'" upheld a trial court ex-
clusion of the testimony of certain witnesses
offered by the defendant to establish an alibi,
i.e., the defendant could not have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed.
The reason for the exclusion being the de-
fendant had not given the prosecution the
statutorily required notice of his intention to
present an alibi. In considering the purpose
behind the alibi statute, the Thayer court re-
marked at page 657 :
"This law pertains to a very important
feature of the criminal law. It gives the state
some protection against false and fraudulent
claims of alibi often presented by the ac-
cused so near the close of the trial as to make
it quite impossible for the state to' ascertain
any facts as to the credibility of the witnesses
called by the accused who may reside at
some point far distant from the place of the
trial."
Tn State V. Kopaclca,14 the court here up-
held the constitutionality of their states alibi
statute and accordingly held notice of one's
alibi was not notice of a different alibi
one's alibi was not notice of a different alibi
produced at trial. The court quoted with favor
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the policy rationale as quoted above from
State. V. Thayer.
People V. Schade'? was the first New York
case upholding that state's alibi statute on the
grounds that the prosecutor's demand for a
bill of particulars as to the defendant's alibi
did not compel the latter to be a witness
against himself but merely to give notice if
he intends to submit an alibi. At page 617,
the court declared that
"The purpose of the adoption of the alibi
statutes in Ohio, Michigan, and this state is
obvious. It was designed to prevent the sud-
den 'popping-up' of witnesses to prove that
the accused was not at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. . . .
The bringing into the courtroom of 'phoney
alibi' witnesses at the eleventh hour and at
a time which, in practice, affords the prose-
cutor no opportunity to check either the
credibility of the witnesses or the accuracy
of their statement ... "
This then is the authority upon which the
California Supreme Court made its ultimate
determination for allowing discovery by the
prosecution in a criminal action.l'' It should
be noted that in all these cases, the prosecu-
tion was seeking, as .the local statutes allowed,
the particulars of the defendant's alibi if he
intended to use one at trial. In no case did the
prosecution seek nor the local statutes allow
discovery of a defendant's documents, records,
and the like. Sure, these cases held the alibi
statutes strictly limited to notification of the
particulars of an alibi did not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination, but this
is not to say that the same would apply to
general rights of discovery by the prosecution.
In point of fact, the purpose of the alibi
statutes as quoted earlier was in no way in-
tended to give the prosecution a right of dis-
covery, but merely to prevent fradulent
eleventh hour alibis at trial by witnesses un-
der the sway or control of the defendant.
Therefore, the authority cited by the Jones
Court does not provide any foundation upon
which its decision could be maintained.
The only .other cases in the United States
which appear to involve any form of discov-
ery by the prosecution are three Federal Dis-
trictCourt decisions, none of which were cited
in Jones. These three decisions gave the United
States a limited right of discovery against the
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defendants on the basis of Rule 17c of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18
U.S.C.A.17 However, neither of these decis-
ions can or could have served as a basis of
authority for Jones because on their particu-
lar facts the self-incrimination privilege was
not directly involved: United States V. Gross18
and United States V. Woodner19 were in-
stances where the prosecution sought inspec-
tion of business records required to be main-
tained by law and thus outside the ambit of the
self-incrimination privilege; United States V.
Lilly Co." involved a corporation and hence
the privilege again did not apply. To repeat,
Jones V. Superior Court definitely is the only
case within the ambit of United States case
authority allowing the prosecution a right of
discovery against a defendant where the self-
incrimination privilege was directly involved.P
It must be remembered that in 1962,. the
date of the Jones decision the United States
Supreme Court was still two years away from
ruling upon issues which Malloy V. Hogan
presented.f" In Malloy, the petitioner had been
found in contempt by local Superior Court
for refusing to answer certain questions. The
petitioner had refused to answer "on the
grounds it may tend to incriminate me." The
application for a writ of habeas corpus was
denied by the Supreme Court of Connecticut
on the premise ". . . that the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination was
not available to a witness in a state proceed-
ing . . ." In reversing the decision of the
Connecticut State Courts, the United States
Supreme Court held " ... that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed the petitioner the pro-
tection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination . . ."23 Further-
more, the federal standards pertaining to self-
incrimination are applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment for
. "It would be incongrous to' have different
standards determine the validity of a claim
or privilege based on the same feared prose-
cution, depending en whether the claim was
asserted in a state or federal court, There-
tore, the same standards must determine
whether an accused's silence in either a fed-
eral or state proceeding is justified."24
Thus, at the time of the J ones decision
there existed dual standards as te the extent
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of the privilege against self-incrimination.
There is no question but that the federal
standard 'Was considerably mere protective
than the California standard. Whether or net
the United States Supreme Court would de-
clare prosecution discovery violative of the
privilege against self-incrimination is still an
cpen question, However, several recent de-
cisions by the Court indicate the answer can
only be answered' in the affirmative: These
recent decisions are incorporated into the re-
cent California decision of People V. Ilorado'"
where it was declared
"We held, in the light of recent decisions of
the United .States Supreme Court, that, once
the Investigation focused en defendant, any
incriminating statements given by defendant
during interrogatdon by the investigating ef-
ficers became inadmissible in the absence
of counsel ...
" ... that the constitutional right to' counsel
precludes the use of incriminating state-
ments elicited by the police during an ac-
cusatory investdgatton unless that right is
intelligently waive ... " (emphasis added)
It seems strange that both the United States
Supreme Court'" and the California Supreme
Court have based the inadmissibility of the
incriminating statements upon the denial of
the tight to counsel as opposed to basing the
constitutional violation upon infringement of
the privilege against self-incrimination since
the decisions stress the investigators (the po-
lice) .neither informed the defendant of his
right to counsel nor his right to remain com-
pletely silent. Nevertheless, violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination is inherent
in the Dorado decision and the two United
States Supreme Court decisions, i.e., the in-
criminating statements because they are in-
criminating are inadmissible. Thus, the basic
inconsistent positions of Jones and Dorado are
made apparent and in probable effect Dorado
and the two United States Supreme Court de-
cisions have overruled J ones indirectly .:
Leaving the self-incrimination area, there
is still another basis for attack upon the Iones
ruling which was not considered Within the
framework of the decision. The basis of the
attack would evolve around the constitutional
guarantee against an unreasonable search and
seizure and would fellow this line of argu-
ment.
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In Boyd V. United States," there was a
provision within a customs statute providing
for limited criminal discovery by the prose-
cution. This provision was held to be an un-
reasonable search and seizure within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the pro-
vision calling for discovery against the de-
fendant was unconstitutional.
Mapp V. Ohio28 provided that the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited the states from conducting an un-
reasonable search and seizure and if evidence
was so secured, it was inadmissible at trial.
The problem then centers around whether the
United States Supreme Court will apply the
federal standard as to an unreasonable search
and seizure or apply a less stringent standard
to the states. It must be remembered that the
Fourth Amendme-nt provides a specific guar-
antee whereas the protection against state in-
fringement comes from the very broad con-
fines of the Fourteenth Amendment's due pro-
cess clause. There was dicta in Ker V. Cali-
[ornur" that the federal standard applied to
the states in regard to the individuals pro-
tection against an unreasonable search and
seizure. Mallo,)" V. Hogan, supra, appears to
take it for granted that the Ker decision held
the federal standard applied to the states. Of
course, this pronouncement in Malloy V. H 0-
gan was dicta."? In this regard, it should be
repeated and noted that the United States
Supreme Court in Malloy applied the federal
standard as derivitive of the Fifth Amend-
ment's specific guarantee against self-incrimi-
nation to the slates. Therefore, it appears quite
likely that the federal standard protecting the
right against unreasonable search and seizures
will be applied to the states. It appears cer-
tain, on the authority of Boyd V. United States,
that if the federal standard applies to the
states, the action ordered by the Jones court
would he unconstitutional.
In conclusion, it is singularly apparent that
the train of modern American judicial think-
ing has long since rejected such utterances
that the privilege against self-incrimination
". . . is the privilege of crime; the interest
of justice would be little promoted by its en-
largement ... "31 Even the statement of Ben-
jamin Cardozo whose pre-eminence in Ameri-
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can jurisprudence goes unquestioned appears
outdated in regards to modern legal thought
on the privilege: "Few would be so narrow
or provincial as to maintain that a fair and
enlightened system of justice would be im-
possible without ... the immunity from com-
pulsory self-incrimination. This too might be
lost, and justice still be done ... "32
In the light of the foregoing 'discussion, the
1962 decision of Jones V. Superior Court
appears similarly outdated as well as in di-
rect conflict with the great American legal
ideal of social justice for all.
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NEWS FROM THE LAW LIBRARY
by Professor Richard Rank,
Law Librarian
The past year has been a busy one for the
Law Library as 16,934 volumes were added
to the Library's collection, which now has
passed the 65,000 volume mark. The sig-
nificance of the volume of our last year's
acquisition is brought out more vividly by
comparison with other libraries. Thus, for
example, the Los Angeles County Law Li-
brary-a library about ten times the holdings
of the Loyola Law Library, and with a full
time staff of over forty people-acquired
only 14,500 volumes during the same period
of time.
Of the new acquisitions, 14,'310 volumes
were acquired through donations, and 2,624
volumes through purchase. During the year,
two special collections were started. One col-
lection is in the field of International Law
with special emphasis on the legal aspects of
foreign trade and commerce. This collection
was set-up with the help of a donation from
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The other
collection is in the field of Aviation and
Space Law and was established with the help'
of the Douglas Aircraft Corporation. Again
this academic year the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation generously has renewed their
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grant which will enable us to continue with
the build-up of our International Law col-
lection.
During the current year we plan to con-
centrate on improving our Reference col-
lection. Fortunately, our Law Reports section
now is fairly complete, and the Library pos-
sesses three complete sets of the National Re-
porter System. Also our Statutes and Codes
section is fairly complete, and in addition the
Library possesses all basic sets of English
reports and statutes.
This Fall two new members joined the Law
Library staff. Mrs. Bertha S. Dorsey is now
our Day Circulation and Reference Librarian.
She was formerly Law Librarian at the Law
Firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher. Our
previous Circulation Assistant, Miss Carol
Easter resigned this summer to get married.
OUT Evening Circulation and Reference Li-
brarian is Mr. Norbert Prins, who holds a law
degree from the Southwestern University.
This semester we have introduced some new
circulation procedures, including a time clock
and a fine system hoping that these might im-
prove our services to the students and faculty.
The Library has also acquired a Xerox photo
duplicating machine, and during the first
(Continued on page 31)
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Time is moving at the doube or so it seems
now that the hour borrowed ~t the fag end
of April has to be paid back in kind, come
the dying hours or late October ... They
served valiantly, . . . these dependable sixty
minutes, ... the Sovereign State of California
provided them by Statute, ... as they held
off daily the shadows lengthening into dark-
ness ... The nearest answer we have to the
poet's plaint, "Backward, turn backward 0
Time in your flight" ... Time is money, ...
it pays rich dividends if invested wisely and
well ... the shining hour must be used to
the full, . . . for too soon night comes on
when no man can work ... Stepping off the
hours with its staccato tread, time halted
momentarily only a few days ago to honor
Professor Becker, whose more than thirty
years of association with the School, almost
spans its history, beginning in the Grand
Avenue Maison to its present commodious
quarters. It was an "Ave et Vale" reunion
rich in memories of the early beginnings of
,the School and of its operation during the
Great War ... when, at one time among
other achievements, it shared honors with
Yale, whose fifty-five students, gave it the
largest law school enrollment in the coun-
try ... Of course, libations were poured out
on the .altar of friendship and wreaths were
laid at the Shrine of loyalty and devotion ...
for "Jake" as he was called by the legions
who were the beneficiaries of his teaching
left behind no unfinished business and there
were no short-cuts in his treatment of knotty
problems ... The toot-nose in fine print
and the rule of law 'in bold black-face type
got the same articulate treatment ... noth-
ing set forth in casebook Dr text was ever
short-changed ... Everybody got his money's
worth ... In fact, his booming voice was so
much a part of him and the School that as
soon as you heard it, there was no doubt
where you were. This occasion was not with-
out the shock of separation ... how could it
be otherwise, where one had dispensed wis-
dom and energy for a generation training
the lawyer of tomorrow ... a lot of senti-
ment has grown up around the spot and the
shock of severence, ., is not without the
touch of grim reality ... We are fortified,
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however, in the knowledge that "Jake", the
sonorous voice of "Law in Business" ... will
not be too far removed tOo steal out of re-
tirement, and in the cloistered atmosphere
of his office in the Law SChDOl,recall the
days that were and rejoice that he was no
small part in them . . . In the wake of
Betsy, ... the irate femme who lashed to a
fury the waters of the Gulf and wrought
havoc with its violence-packed hurricanes,
. . . WILLIAM HOWARD ROUNDTREE, '56
blew into our peaceful Pueblo only a day
ago ... out here for a couple of depositiO'ns,
he dropped in to report on the ten years. since
he returned to his native Florida after gradu-
ation ... He admitted that the only two
places to live in this world are California
and Florida ... He conceded that he is so
entrenched in the practice of law and so
occupied in politics, that he is not on the
point of changing his domictle from Cocoa,
Florida ... He represents Brevard County
in the State Legislature ... Mayhap the rich-
est source of informatiDn on missile develop-
ment ... Here Cape Kennedy is located
whence Gemini V started the Odyssey of
space and made the epic of Homer look like
Boys' Week in industry and government ...
JOSEPH E. MORRIS '59 and JOHN YATES,
'59, with courage and determinat,ion, started
practice together almost before they took off
their graduatiDn robes ... They are at it
still and all the evidence would indicate it
was a profitable venture ... They are surely
taking seriously the "War on Poverty" pro--
gram ... A short time ago they sounded the
siren tor a reception in the valley where they
have a new office ... It was a quality affair
and 'brought out many of the "Old Guard"
of the last six years ... Established as he is
now the Army career JO'e considered while
at Camp Roberts, is now behind him . . .
'Among loyal Loyolans prominent at the soiree
was CHARLES BOWERS, '29. He was gradu-
ated in the depth of the depression but with
courage and fortitude he survived nobly. Ac-
tive in the practice, he is a member of the
. firm of Spray, Gould and Bowers . . . Ob-
servers note that recently he was looking
out towards the sunset sea and showed in-
terest in some form of "Leisure World" .
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Investment counsellors on Spring Streeit who
knew Charlie since he was claims adjuster,
are eager to inform clients, that five will
make them ten, he doesn't do it ...
THOMASCLIFFORDMURPHY, '40, recently
appointed to the Municipal Court in the Los
Angeles Judicial District, lost no time in put-
ting to work his recently acquired authority
... He received his baptism of fire in Traffic
Court ... Here he brought much understand-
ing sympathy to work with him and demon-
strated his patience to the point.. almost of
snapping, that it was quite obvious to the
initiated that this was his meat and drink
and started him on the climb to judicial emi-
nence ... JUSTICE OTTO M. KAUS, '49, at
the invitation of the Presiding Judge, ad-
dressed the recently appointed Judges of the
Superior Court at induction ceremonies late
in September ... They were eight in all and
included one Loyolan, the Honorable JAMES
D. TANTE, '48, ... Jim has been moved up
higher in judicial circles in recent days, with
such deserved regularity that we have had
many occasions now to appreciate this recog-
nition of judicial talent ... In fact, Tante
and Talent are correlative terms ... The
Justice, no matter what his assignment, never
fails to perform with the know-how and ex-
cellence that becometh an Aggeler Scholar ...
FRED MARTINO, '39, Alumni President, per-
formed with his fine touch of finesse as host
at the Sympostum, now an established tra-
dition at the State Bar Convention ... Not
seen there was JOHN T. HOURIGAN, the
country lawyer from Delano ... the first
time he was neither present nor accounted
for since the memory of man runneth not
to the contrary ... Even bucolic neighbor
Louis LaRose who is generally able to, ac-
count tor his whereabouts, isn't talking ...
HAROLDA. ABBOTT, '53, is domiciled in an
isolated spot in northern California where
one has to go to on purpose ... Susanville,
the county seat of Lassen, will never be
reached by accident. To get to this spot takes
determination and resolve ... Harold did
just that and liked the place SOl much he
remained and today practically runs the
county ... He's doing a great job in the
war on poverty and serving as Public Ad-
mintstrator and District Attorney ... MARY
GERTRUDE CREUTZ, '54, always reliable in
providing the fine feminine, touch to Bar
Activities, at both state and local levels ...
Just now she is second V.P. of the Lawyers'
Club ... Another plateau or so and she's in
... And fortunate is the Group that has her
leadership.
30
A DUMPORS CASE
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THE MAN FROM V.N.C.I...E.
(Continued from page 21)
As the door opened they rushed simultan-
eously to grasp the small, white pamphlets
that meant victory or defeat.
Jubilant, Bond discovered the holding in'
the case just decided was in his favor. He
now had his case in point and the long hours
of labor would be rewarded. Ferne would
. be put out of court. It occurred to Bond that
since she would be out of court, perhaps she
was free for dinner. The remainder of the
evening would now be contingent on Ferne ...
BOARD OF BAR GOVERNORS
(Continued from page 22)
be held as a gala: after final party, informal
beer busts at the school, development of a
pre-legal committee to inform undergradu-
ates at various local colleges as to what a
legal education entails;' and many other pro-
jects now in the process of development.
This semester has started out on a high
note, the note of accomplishment, We hope
to continue this spirit by adopting programs
of interest to the student body and providing
the resources to develop your interest in the
law besides the fundamental book learning.
The board, as your representative of the
student body, can only develop on your ideas
and interest in achieving the best for Loyola
Law School. We are willing and able to serve,
NEWS FROM THE LAW LIBRARY
(Contmued from page 28)
month of its operation we have already pro-
duced over 3,000 copies.
On September 13, the Law School cele-
brated the World Law Day, and the Law Li-
brary contributed through a book exhibit on
World Peace Through World Law. This ~x-
hibit is still on display in the Library's.
Lounge-Browsing Area during the month of
October incorporates four major areas: the
first one pertaining to the Legal Regulation
of World Trade and Commerce, the second
containing basic documents in the field of
World Law, the third showing materials in
the field of International Organization, and
the fourth presenting reports of the Iruerna-
tional and World Courts.
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A.L.S.A. SUMMER CONVENTION
(Continued from page 10)
ALSA by the ABA. Thus ALSA serves both
the individual members and the member as-
sociations.
The convention is set up to meet three goals.
First, the delegates meet to transact such busi-
ness as is necessary to keep the Association
a functioning organization. Second, the dele-
gates meet to discuss problems and programs
encountered and established at their indi-
vidual schools. Third, the delegates meet to
broaden their own education through seminars
presented by leading jurists in the United
States.
The first of these goals is self-explanatory.
It involves the election of officers, reports of
committees and the presentation of resolu-
tions and amendments.
. The second goal was the most beneficial
in that it gave each delegate an opportunity
to discuss the problems faced by their mem-
ber associations. If one school faced a prob-
lem another school had most likely already
encountered and solved it. Through these dis-
cussions each delegate was able to get a num-
ber of ideas for programs that might be of
benefit to his organization. Such topics as
speakers programs, mo,ot court, placement
service, public relations, blood banks and stu-
dent bar loans programs were a few that were
discussed in detail in the round-table dis-
cussion groups.
The third goal, individual education, was
also very successful. The theme for the Sum-
mer 1965 eonvention was "Education for
Advocacy" and the talks and seminars pre-
sented followed this theme. There was a Ques-
"rioned Document seminar, a Symposium on
Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws,
a talk on Advocacy in Trial and Appellate
Brief Writing and a seminar on Trial Tech-
niques in Criminal and Civil Cases.
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The Scarlet Books
A
D
s UPPLEMENT your federal, labor and statereports and statutes.
H ELP you to ascertain quickly and preciselythe judicial history of every state or federal
decision.
E LlMINATE much of what would otherwise belaborious and time consuming research.
p ROVIDE quickly and precisely both the judi-cial and the legislative history of constitu-
tional and statutory provisions.
SSIST you in supplementing your textbooks,
digests, encyclopedias and other volumes in
your library.
R ENDER immediately accessible the vast bodyof law in your reports and statutes and lead
. you to articles' in legal periodicals.
ETERMINE the authoritative' value of cases
and statutes on which you plan to rely.
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COLORADO SPRINGS
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